

ASEAN SME CASE STUDY
AGRI-BUSINESS IN JAPAN
JA UMAJI AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
A bold revitalization strategy
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In 1987, JA Umaji emerged as one of the most successful entities in the agro-business sector of Japan. Its rehabilitation was the full responsibility of Mr. Mochifumi Totani, then Assistant Manager of JA Umaji (Japanese Agricultural Cooperative in Umaji Village).

Mr. Totani responsibility included the rehabilitation of the cooperative association, in particular, JA Umaji, and the village, in general. This was after decades of hardship and a declining economy.

Today, more than 300 public and private groups visit Umaji Village, travelling every year by chartered bus, to learn the secrets of its success.

Background

JA Umaji is a small cooperative association in Umaji Village, whose current population is less than 1000 - the second least populated village, located in the remote region of Kochi Prefecture, Shikoku Island, Japan, with a land area of **16,552 hectares**, and has almost 95% area covered with mountainous forests. Travelling to the village takes almost one hour by car from the nearest city.

JA Umaji Agricultural Cooperative was established in 1948 with paid up capital of Yen 190,509, following the provisions of the 1947 Agricultural Cooperatives Law.

JA (Japanese Agricultural Cooperatives) is the nation-wide agricultural cooperative association, with 957 member cooperative associations, including JA Umaji.

JAs were organized in accordance with the agricultural land reform act, to protect family-run farmers created after World War II, and prevent them into becoming tenant farmers again. Most of these JAs mainly engaged in finance, insurance, purchasing, sales, farm management and providing guidance on agricultural technical issues and other services.

The key industry of Umaji Village was Forestry, until the early 1970s, when it shrunk rapidly, following the trend of the total forestry industry in Japan (see Note 1). This affected in fewer job opportunities and caused unemployment, resulting in major migration of the younger village residents, who had no choice but leave their homes to look for jobs in urban areas and few come back. Consequently, only the elderly people remained in the village.

Aside from fewer job opportunities, revenue from the forest industry greatly decreased. Umaji Village was ailing from the fundamental problem currently faced by Japan: a declining and an aging population (see Note 2.)

The situation in Umaji is worse. The population of this village decreased drastically from 3600 in 1948 to 982 as of March 2012. On top of that, 38% of the population is over 65 years old while the national average is 23% (see Exhibit I, Demographic Data of Umaji Village).

Note 1.

Japan's 66% forest cover made it one of the most heavily forested countries in the world. However, after liberalizing timber import in 1964, the Japanese timber self-sufficiency rate drastically decreased from 86.7% in 1960 to 26.0% in 2010.

Cheaper imported lumber directly affected the domestic forestry operations and the domestic forestry industry became less competitive and less profitable.

In addition, the lower wages and harsh working environment pushed the younger generation away from this industry.

Note 2.

As of March 2012, the population of Japan is 127,650,000, making it the tenth most populated country in the world.

However in recent years, Japan experienced a loss in net population loss, due to decreasing birth rates and almost no net immigration, despite having one of the highest life expectancies in the world at 81.25 years of age.

Japan's population will keep declining by about one million people every year in the coming decades. It means that the population will shrink from the current 128 million to a staggering 87 million by 2060.

Also, by 2060, Japan's elderly population, aged 65 and above is expected to increase from 23.1% to 40%.

The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare's research organization released the data on January 26, 2012. The group, called the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, provides a 50-year demographic forecast every five years.

New Business Development

To provide job opportunities and to revitalize the village economy, JA Umaji had to introduce a new business venture.

In 1961, the Japanese Government passed the law on Fruit Promotion and Development, to encourage each region to plant specific fruit such as apple, pear, peach, persimmon, plum, grape, water melon and Yuzu.

JA Umaji selected **Yuzu** (see Note 3.) as its choice of fruit, upon deciding to participate in this program. This was a natural selection for JA Umaji, since Yuzu trees were growing wild in this region.

The cooperative encouraged its member farmers to plant Yuzu trees. At that time, nobody expected that the Yuzu plantation project would become their savior.

In 1965, JA Umaji distributed Yuzu seedling to their coop members and set the following rules:

1. Targeted output - 2 tons per acre
2. Organic farming,
3. No herbicide use
4. Applying compost instead of chemical fertilizer
5. Planting additional trees at vacant space or replacing other trees
6. Replanting new Yuzu trees by felling old ones to improve productivity per acre

The member farmers delivered all the harvests to JA Umaji Agricultural Cooperative, who in turn, sold Yuzu as fruit or squeezed juice to local food processing firms. In the early days, the manual processing was sufficient to handle small quantity.

The local market in Shikoku Island is rather small, with several other villages that also developed Yuzu plantations. Outside of this region, especially in Northeastern regions, on the other hand, Yuzu is not well known and other citric fruits are readily available.

Consequently, these Yuzu growers, including Umaji Village, had no choice but to sell the crops to local processing operators, creating severe competition among the producers in terms of price and quality.

In Umaji Village, Yuzu harvest gradually increased, even though the volume harvest varied yearly. However, the JA Umaji agricultural cooperative encountered a major problem on revenues from Yuzu sales, due to the volatile price fluctuation that continued yearly. For years of bumper crop, the price dropped so sharply that they incurred operating losses. The more they sold, the more the loss was accumulated. There was no way JA Umaji could control the price fluctuation as long as they sold the fruits to the local food processing companies. It had been a buyers' market all the time.

Worse, the Yuzu fruit grown by Umaji Village was more susceptible to price fluctuation than others during the years of larger crop because their Yuzu fruit looked smaller and less appealing, with black spots on the rind (see Exhibit II, Picture of Typical Umaji Yuzu Fruit), as compared with the ones produced by other villages. This is mainly because of the poor plantation

maintenance practice resulting from the shortage of field workers and limited funds, attributable to the aging and decreasing population of this village plus financial problem of the coop.

Likewise, during the period of high growth economy in Japan (from 1965 to 1973), consumers preferred high quality products and they did not mind paying more for better products. This consumers' preference made Umaji Yuzu less and less competitive. Ironically, this disadvantage became an advantage when Japan entered a period of stable growth rate as health conscious consumers developed an awareness and preference for organic and natural products that permeated widely.

Note 3.

Yuzu is one of the most popular of the acid citrus fruits, used in food preparation in East Asia. It originated from Korea, was introduced into China, and eventually made its way into southern Japan, approximately 1000 years ago.

It is a type of citrus fruit, and had been growing wild in this region for a long time. It is smaller than an orange. The flavor is sour and it is usually not used for eating fresh like an orange or tangerine. It is mainly used for the aroma and flavor of the rind, which is added to various dishes including soups, fish, candies and medicinal teas and/or used as food flavoring to improve the taste.

Its juice is commonly used as a seasoning similar to the way the lemon is used in other cuisines. It is an integral ingredient in the citrus-based sauce called "ponzu", and Yuzu vinegar is also produced. Yuzu is often combined with honey to make Yuzu tea or as an ingredient in alcoholic drinks. It is also used to make syrup, marmalade, cake, liquor and wine.

In Umaji, as described above, the Yuzu output gradually increased beginning 1965 but did not necessarily help boost the village economy (see Exhibit III, Total Citrus Fruit Output in Japan and the Yuzu Market Share of Umaji). This is because of its poor quality, severe price competition and the limited size of the local market. During the same period, the forestry industry was also deteriorating, affected adversely by the cheaper imported lumber and shortage of labor force.

Consequently, Umaji was trapped in the spiral depression.

Ailing forest industry + poor performance of Yuzu business:

→ less job opportunities → decreasing/aging population → economic downturn

Umaji was hit hard especially in 1987, when Shikoku Prefecture experienced the largest Yuzu harvest in history. The price went down sharply and the stock piled up in the warehouse.

With this crisis, JA Umaji was given an urgent mission to come up with a master plan to sell the product speedily, as much as possible. Mr. Totani, then Assistant Manager and now Chairman of JA Umaji, led this project. His task is not only to solve the immediate problem but also to find a long term solution to cope with the sagging local economy. It was not an easy assignment for him at all because of the limited resources:

- 1) a limited land availability in the village (cultivable space of only 45 ha on the steep mountainous slopes.
- 2) shortage of man power
- 3) distance location of the village from the major markets
- 4) scarce funding source.

It was impossible to develop a new business from scratch due to lack of funding, no technological competency and time constraint. It necessitated Mr. Totani to create a new business venture from something surrounding their lives.

After several weeks of brainstorming session with his colleagues, he made a recommendation to the board members. After hearing his presentation, the board approved his plan instantly. This was not because they were fully convinced with his idea, but because there was no other alternative plan.

Mr. Totani's proposal is to promote Yuzu, not just as fresh fruit or simply squeezed juice, but as a value-added processed product. Since the inventory kept piling up, they could not afford to waste any time. The coop took the following ambitious action steps. If they fail in this project, JA Umaji would have been forced to file for bankruptcy and the village would have been deserted.

1. Development of value-added Yuzu products
2. Product differentiation
3. Directly marketing
4. Targeting nation-wide marketing

1. Value Added Products

It took a while to develop a new Yuzu product. But finally, in 1988, after a few months of trial and error, Umaji commenced production of two new products:

- (1) Fresh Yuzu juice mixed with honey and water without preservatives. It looked so easy to process this juice but, in reality, it required more than a month to satisfy participated testers. They had to adjust blending of Yuzu juice, honey and water; and
- (2) "Ponzu" (see Note 4). Ponzu is not a new product in the market. In 1967, Mizkan, one of the largest food companies in Japan, already introduced it in the market. Mizkan was using rice vinegar instead of citrus fruit as one of the ingredients. In 1980s, although Yuzu per se was not well known nationwide, Ponzu was already commonly used in Japan homes and restaurants. Mr. Totani anticipated that their Ponzu would be accepted by

consumers by adding Yuzu extract instead of rice vinegar to improve aroma. The targeted market segment was upper-middle to high end market.

Note 4.

It is a citrus seasoned soy sauce commonly used in Japanese cuisine. ponzu is the rough equivalent of vinaigrette. Ponzu is made by simmering soy sauce, mirin (an essential condiment consisting of 40 -50% sugar with rice wine), rice vinegar, bonito flakes and or seaweed. After cooling, the juice of one or more of the citrus fruit is added.

Ponzu is traditionally used as a dressing for tataki (lightly grilled, then chopped meat or fish), and also as a dip for hot pot dishes.

However, the citrus fruit-based Ponzu was not a product peculiar to Umaji Village or Kochi Prefecture. It is a product being processed in various regions and being sold in each regional market where different types of citrus fruits such as Yuzu, sudachi, kabosu or lemon are grown.

Ponzu products are commonly distributed through grocery stores, supermarkets and convenience stores. If Umaji Ponzu was marketed through the regular distribution channels, it would have been treated like all the other ponzu products and given very limited shelf space at retail stores. Also, consumers would not pay much attention to this product as they never heard of such a brand name produced by Umaji, an unknown tiny village, unlike other big players such as Kikkoman and Mizkan.

2. Product Differentiation.

Another issue to be addressed was how its Ponzu can compete and be distinctly different from the other brands already popular in the market. Its price was set in the middle range (see Exhibit II). As for the packing size, 500ml glass bottles were chosen, while most of its competitors are using 300ml to 360ml sizes (see Exhibit III.).

3. Direct Marketing

To avoid direct competition with big players at retail stores, it was rather imperative for JA Umaji to take the direct selling approach. Another reason why direct selling approach was inevitable was its shelf-life of Ponzu Juice. Since the fresh juice is made of Yuzu, honey and water without preservatives, its expiration period is so short that it can't be sold through the traditional wholesale/retail distribution channels. The taste and quality will deteriorate within 4 months from the production. This was literally easier said than done.

Yet, how and where can they begin direct marketing? The coop neither had enough know-how in direct marketing nor had enough capital to start a large scale operation. Further, it would be too costly to build a call center or a packaging/shipment center.

Again, after heated discussion with his colleagues, they reached a conclusion to conduct test marketing at the retail shops inside the village. Even though the sales volume was so limited, Mr. Totani observed that people repeatedly buy the juice, proving that the taste is acceptable and people do not get tired of the taste. This discovery encouraged him to go to next step.

As a stepping stone toward the ultimate goal of marketing nation-wide, tapping the regional market in Shikoku Island was their second step. They approached a local TV station and newspaper for their advertisement and fliers.

To create visual appeal for the products, Mr. Totani decided to order a new label on the bottles for juice and ponzu. A graphic designer, who just moved back to Kochi from highly urbanized Osaka City, was hired to undertake the task of enhancing product packaging and labeling.

Mr. Totani personally met this designer and explained the concept. He asked the designer to create a design which will appeal to nation-wide consumers. After several weeks, the designer submitted his sample labels (see Exhibit IV).

When Mr. Totani saw his samples, he did not make any comment. The designs were completely different from what he had in his mind. Yet, he did not ask him to change the design. He thought the designer would be discouraged if he asked again.

The design and label conceptualized by the designer was a picture that the product originated from a picturesque countryside hometown. The designer's intent was to appeal to those people living in urban areas who long for the peaceful and healthy countryside life.

It was a unique image, but was not fully appreciated by Mr. Totani. Also, the brand name was unique: "Gokkun Umaji Village" in English translated as "Gulp Umaji Village". As for Ponzu product, the naming was "the Village of Yuzu". Instead of marketing the products per se, the designer's intent was aimed at marketing the image of the village.

With the new brand names and product packaging, sales started picking up that they could not cope with the increasing orders through manual processing. So, a processing machine was installed.

They did not stop there or, should say, they could not stop there since the output was further increasing.

Later on, because of this peculiar marketing approach, the clients not only repeated orders, but also start visiting Umaji.

4. Nation-Wide Marketing

The positive results in the regional sales prompted the Promotions and Marketing Team to proceed to its next target: the "department stores". Specifically pinpointed were those located in the highly urbanized cities of Tokyo and Osaka.

Going direct to department stores avoided competition not only with other Yuzu producers in the region but also national brand by bypassing the traditional distribution channels.

The Promotions and Marketing Team aggressively participated in Specialty Food Fairs of these department stores. At night time, the team loaded the truck full of Yuzu products and leave Umaji village in the middle of night, to save lodging expenses. They arrive at department stores early in the morning and, without enough sleep, proceeded to arrange their display at their designated corner in the floor for the special food event and directly dealt with the customers.

However, despite their strong determination, concerted efforts and high expectation, this did not bear immediate results. Seemingly, their approach failed to captivate enough clientele, mainly because Yuzu was not known in other regions and it was a one shot sale.

Usually such a special fairs in the department store lasted only for a few days, so they have to move to the next location.

The volume of sales in each department store was less than breakeven except one occasion, until one day, when a department store floor manager took pity on them and suggested to relocate their booth to a spot near the escalator.

Suddenly, the sales volume increased that they had to request the office to deliver additional goods. Unfortunately, however, they could not select a booth location in other department stores having Specialty Food Fairs. It was the store managers who arranged the location of each participating booth.

Although their efforts did not produce immediate success, they got an important seed for future business growth: a list of more than 3000 clients who bought the products during this campaign. This list became the basis for direct marketing through telephone, direct mail and internet.

In 1989, based on the acquired listing of 3000 customers from the 6-month campaign period, additional customers generated from the regional TV and newspaper advertisement, JA Umaji entered into direct marketing in the form of telephone and direct mail marketing. A small-scale call center was built to improve customer service and to launch telephone marketing.

At the initial stage, when the delivery volume was relatively small, courier service companies refused to go to the village to pick up packages. So, the coop had no other choice but to bring the products to the delivery center in the city by its own trucks. But when the delivery volume increased, the three courier service companies begged to get the orders and promised to deliver the packages to any corner of Japan within two days.

In 1996, the JA Umaji Agricultural Cooperative established its home page, showing not only products, but also published events scheduled in the village. The webpage also included a proactive feedback corner, where customers can exchange opinions, send comments and questions to the coop. The internet website promptly connected this remote village to customers, wherever they are located.

At that time, JA Umaji was the only one agricultural cooperative who used internet marketing, among Yuzu producers not only in Kochi Prefecture but also in Japan as a whole.

Thus in 1998, the processed Yuzu sales of this second least populated village recorded slightly over Yen 2 billion, representing 78% of the total sales of the prefecture.

Also in the same year, Umaji Village constructed a waste treatment facility to decompose and recycle Yuzu residue to make compost. The strained lees are mixed with lime and sawdust to make compost and distributed for free as organic fertilizers to member farmers to apply in Yuzu plantations. The plan is to practice natural recycling agriculture.

Movement of Municipalities and Cooperative Consolidation

In the midst of its economic recovery and boom, Umaji was challenged by the central government to merge with other coops and villages when it enacted the 1961 Act on the Promotion of Merger of Agricultural Cooperatives, to gather the smaller local cooperatives into a large regional fold to streamline management efficiency.

In 1998, when Umaji was still trying to crawl out of the vicious spiral, 13 cooperatives in the region met, to vote for consolidation. 12 coops agreed to merge, except Umaji.

In 1999, the Municipalities Consolidation Law was put into effect by the Japanese Government to cope with the declining population and to streamline inefficient municipalities, especially in rural areas.

This was welcome news for some of the smaller municipalities who were suffering from the similar socio-economic problems like Umaji. Other municipalities were, however, against it to protect their integrity and identity. Those who were in financial trouble were compelled to follow this order. In numerous occasions, Umaji was challenged by the central government to merge with other villages.

Although the 1961 Act on merger seemed a rescue measure for the village, but after heated discussion among the villagers, they voted for autonomy, preferring to maintain its own identity, instead of getting additional special grant from the central government. Umaji was confident that they could weather the storm by themselves. In both cases, Umaji rejected the consolidation proposal.

Strategy for Sustainable Growth

Their direct marketing approach contributed to an increase in sales and a higher profit margin. The annual sales jumped from Yen 89 million (US\$1.2 million) in 1987 to Yen 3 billion (US\$37.5 million) in 2010 (see Exhibit V.).

But the revenue decreased from Yen 3,340 million in 2010 to Yen 3,070 million in 2011, despite the increase in Yuzu output, mainly because of the increasing market competition.

Various new players entered the market, competing in pricing and quality. Some regional producers copied the concept and strategy of JA Umaji by appealing to their natural and healthy image.

To cope with foreseeable heavier market competition, JA Umaji developed new products like Yuzu pepper, tea, jam, marmalade, salad dressing, soap, shampoo, rinse, skin lotion. As of July 30, 2012, their Yuzu product line totaled more than 40 items.

In addition to the new Yuzu product lines, another item called “Monacca” was also introduced. It is a handbag made from thinned cedar, using the residuals from forest thinning. The Cedar trees of this region are famous for their quality, but some had to be cut down during forest thinning operations, necessary to maintain the forest in good condition, leaving behind the removed trees in the forest. Aside from the ecological point of view, JA Umaji took this opportunity to utilize these forest residuals to produce this new item they labeled “Monacca” bags.

Then the coop went on to their next drastic step.

Since JA Umaji was selling the image of the peaceful village surrounded by natural beauty, the customers were more tempted to visit the village.

An internet customer survey was conducted. To one of the questions “Have you visited the village?” 41% of the customers answered “yes” while the 81% who answered “No” said “they would like to visit if there is an opportunity”.

The survey results encouraged Umaji to build a new facility to attract more tourists.

Thereafter, a decision was reached to build an integrated production and shopping facilities, budgeted at Yen 2.5 billion (\$31 million) for over 5 years. However this was far more than the total annual revenue of Umaji Village in 2006, which was Yen 1.98 billion. To meet the construction cash requirement balance, the central government subsidized Yen 600 million as a special grant, and the remaining cost taken from the internally generated cash flow.

The master plan was prepared in 2001 and the facility was completed in 2006. This included not only a processing plant, a packing/distribution terminal and a call center, but also a bakery, restaurant and gift shop to attract tourists (see Exhibit VI).

The sanitation system in their processing plant was also improved, not only to cope with the Food Sanitation Act which was getting stricter every year, but also to sell its clean image. It is located in the middle of the forest to emphasize its integration with nature.

At the gift shop, visitors can buy not only ponzu or juice but also other products made from Yuzu, such as sake, cosmetics and chili powder. Another item in the shop is the “Monacca” lady’s bag made of thinned Japanese cedar harvested in Umaji. Their strategy is to sell the image of Umaji as “Village of Yuzu”.

At present, in addition to the visiting tourists, Umaji Coop has a list of more than 320,000 direct and regular customers, thanks to its image building efforts and development of new products.

To further attract more tourists, the village also promoted its hot spring facility and restored the railroad, rehabilitating the long abandoned locomotives, once used to transport timber from the mountain. Now, the train carries tourists alongside tributary streams of Yasuda River (see Exhibit VII).

In 2011, almost 60,000 tourists visited this small village. The mayor hopes to increase the number of tourist up to 200,000 a year in the near future. To achieve this goal, the village intends to relentlessly work on further improvements and developing new products to ensure their long term sustainable growth.

EXHIBIT I.
Umaji Village
Demographical Data

Year	Total Population	Under 20	Eldery Population over 65 in Umaji	Aging Ratio (over 65) in Umaji	Aging Ratio in Japan
1948	3600				
1970	2134				7.1%
1975	1907				7.9%
1980	1740				9.1%
1985	1501				10.3%
1990	1313				12.1%
1995	1242				14.3%
2000	1195	222	367	30.7%	16.6%
2005	1170	203	387	33.1%	20.2%
2010	1014	171	379	37.4%	23.1%
2011	1015	166	378	37.2%	23.3%
2012	982		374	38.1%	24.10%

Source : Umaji Village Municipal Office Statistical Data (Dec. 2011) and hearing
at the municipal office on July 3, 2012
Statistical Handbook of Japan 2011 and forecast for 2012

EXHIBIT II.
PICTURE OF UMAJI YUZU WITH BLACK SPOTS ON ITS RIND



EXHIBIT III.

Citric Fruit & Yuzu Output in Japan

Year	Total Citrus Fruit Output (tons)	Total Yuzu Output	Share of Yuzu	Processed Yuzu	Umaji Yuzu Output	Umaji Yuzu Market Share
2000	146,375	14,474	10%	9,829	605	6%
2001	168,166	16,306	10%	10,675	610	6%
2002	144,985	14,676	10%	9,353	544	6%
2003	146,611	13,688	9%	8,894	557	6%
2004	153,369	17,231	11%	13,332	679	5%
2005	154,706	14,323	9%	10,128	477	5%
2006	143,362	14,580	10%	10,470	539	5%
2007	320,122	18,845	6%	14,181	628	4%
2008	320,819	18,211	6%	13,826	723	5%
2009	328,255	25,438	8%	20,805	1036	5%

The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Year 2010 Statistical Data
 Umaji Village Municipal Office Statistical Data, December 2011


EXHIBIT IV
MAJOR PONZU BRAND PRICE RANGE

Brand	Price (Yen)	Volume (ml)	Per ml (Yen)
Nachikatsura	1155	700	1.65
Kitayama	840	360	2.33
Fuji	819	360	2.28
Umaji	698	500	1.40
Teraoka	693	250	2.77
Kobashi	680	360	1.89
Yoshinogawa	630	360	1.75
Taihei	609	360	1.69
Tosapon	580	360	1.61
Hikariura	557	360	1.55
Yamasa	498	500	1.00
Kikoman	360	250	1.44
Mitsukan Ajipon	298	360	0.83

Source : Rakuten Internet Shopping, Ponzu as of 8/30/12

EXHIBIT V

LABEL SAMPLES



Label for Ponzu
Source : JA Umaji Home Page



Label for Yuzu Juice

EXHIBIT VI.

YUZU OUTPUT AND REVENUE

Umaji Village Coop. Yuzu Output and Revenue

Year	Yuzu Output (tons)	Revenue	(Yen ,000)
			No. of Employee
1987	307	89,460	10
1992	293	800,173	22
1997	422	1,836,698	38
2002	544	2,937,790	62
2007	628	2,987,629	70
2008	723	3,205,244	72
2009	1036	3,152,688	75
2010	719	3,234,137	77
2011	890	3,070,000	81

Source : Umaji Village Municipality Office Statistics- December 2011

EXHIBIT VII.

LIST OF YUZU FOREST FACILITY

JA Umaji Head Office : Renovated the old office built in 1953

JA Supermarket

Yuzu Processing Plant 1(juice and ponzu bottling) : 4,475 m²

Yuzu Processing Plant 2 (juice squeezing): 1,941 m²

Yuzu Processing Plant 3(other than juice) : 2,029 m²

Yuzu Processing Plant 4 (salad dressing, refined yuzu oil:1,807 m²

Yuzu Processing Plant5 (skin care products) : 452 m²

Bakery Shop

Restaurant

Gift Shop

EXHIBIT VIII.

REVIVED LOCOMOTIVE



Source: Umaji Village Website